

Challenges in the creation of a Southern African sub-regional security community

Gina van Schalkwyk

P.O. Box 1787, 905-142, Garsfontein, 0042, Pretoria, South Africa; ginavanschalkwyk@yahoo.com

Conflict and political instability continue to characterise African states and global trends point toward the devolution of the responsibility for conflict management from the United Nations (UN) to regional and sub-regional levels. This poses a significant challenge to sub-regional security arrangements such as the Southern African Development Community Organ for Politics Defence and Security Co-operation (SADC OPDSC). This article resists the temptation to submit to OPDSC-pessimism in view of the failures of the Organ since its inception. Instead it focuses on the immediate short-term challenges as opportunities to be exploited through a partnership between the public and private sector with the active involvement of civil society and the international community. In particular, it emphasises the need for a clear, institutionalised, policy framework that will allow the sub-regional security system to operate (relatively) free from political interference by ruling elites and in the interest of all the citizens of Southern Africa.

At the dawn of the third millennium conflict and political instability continue to characterise African states and global trends point toward the devolution of the responsibility for conflict management from the United Nations (UN) to regional and sub-regional levels. This poses a significant challenge to sub-regional security arrangements such as the Southern African Development Community Organ for Politics Defence and Security Co-operation (SADC OPDSC, hereafter referred to as OPDSC or the Organ) [1].

Not since the height of Apartheid destabilisation of the region in the mid-1980s has there been such an urgent need for the establishment of a security arrangement that takes into account not only security from threats, but also security from want for the people of Southern Africa. However, the local and global environments in which the thirteen states that make up the Southern African Development Community [2] search for peace and security has changed considerably since the 1980s. The long-standing civil wars in Mozambique and Angola have come to an end; Namibia has gained independence; the oppressive Apartheid regime in South

Africa has been replaced by a nascent democracy; and a conflict that erupted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998 continues to simmer. At the international level, the fall of the Berlin wall in 1990 brought an end to the Cold War bipolar global security structure exposing hitherto hidden ethnic and geographic divides between and within states; the international capitalist system is flourishing and is rewarding fast-growing industrial economies leaving behind those that are struggling to emerge from the havoc wreaked by colonialism, socialism and war; China is emerging as a considerable economic and military entity; and the 'war on terror' dominates the international security agenda – often at the expense of pressing demands for United Nations attention to conflicts and humanitarian disasters in Africa and other developing nations.

Cognisant of these realities and the need to create a safe and secure environment in which accelerated development can take place, the leaders of Southern Africa have embarked upon efforts to revive and transform existing collective security arrangements amongst them and agree upon further mechanisms to this effect. But, the search for a common sub-regional agenda for peace, human security and conflict management has encountered a number of obstacles along the way and further challenges abound.

This article resists the temptation to submit to OPDSC-pessimism in view of the failures of the Organ since its inception. Instead it focuses on the immediate short-term challenges as opportunities to be exploited through a partnership between the public and private sector with the active involvement of civil society and the international community. In particular, it emphasises the need for a clear, institutionalised, policy framework that will allow the sub-regional security system to operate (relatively) free from political interference by ruling elites and in the interest of all the citizens of Southern Africa.

Security and security systems

In the 1990s the security debate shifted towards the recognition of a concept of 'human security' as a counter-balance to mere state- and/or regime security. Human security places the individual at the centre of security and emphasises not only freedom from threat, but also the need for economic, social and political security of the individual. However, since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001 there has been a return to neo-conservatism and the militarisation of security on a global scale. This has seen a resurgence of the debate on the merits of human security versus state security that will not be discussed at length in this article [3]. In the context of this article, the assumption is that the challenge is not a choice between the two perspectives, but rather the need to achieve the right balance between human and military security in the Southern African region.

In the Protocol establishing the SADC Organ there are a number of references which implicitly recognise the importance of an approach to security that emphasises the security of people and the non-military dimensions of security [4]. Amongst other in the preamble, where heads of state acknowledge that 'peace, security and strong political relations are critical factors in creating a conducive environment for regional co-operation and integration'; Article 2, 2(g) where they commit themselves to 'promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights...'; and, Article 2, 2(i) that highlights the need to 'promote a community based approach to domestic security' [5].

As they are inextricably linked, the conceptual framework for the Organ should be read in conjunction with the Treaty establishing SADC [6]; the founding documents of the African Union (AU) [7] and in particular the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) [8] and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) [9]; the framework document of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) [10]; and the principles of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) [11], which all acknowledge that developmental and integration goals/objectives need to be reconciled with the tasks of conflict prevention, conflict management, peacekeeping, and even, at times, peace enforcement.

The logical conclusion from these linkages between security and development would be the creation of a 'security community' in the Southern African region. Common security refers to a stage beyond the recognition of shared security interests towards the inculcation of shared norms and values. It furthermore dictates the need for aligning each and every country's domestic policy and behaviour with that of the community, implying a degree of 'loss of sovereignty' that is dependent upon a high level of mutual trust within the grouping of states.

While there is a recognised need for the creation of a security community in Southern Africa and numerous agreements are being concluded to this effect, such a community does not yet exist in the region. Many argue that while the legal basis exists in treaties and protocols, the political will to fully implement these arrangements lacks behind [12]. What currently exists in the region can at best be described as a collaborative or co-operative security regime characterised by instruments such as a mutual defence pact (that will be discussed in some detail later in the article) and a number of weak institutions aimed at identifying shared security interests.

As SADC moves to a common security system, a number of institutional, conceptual, and other challenges need to be addressed in a systematic and sustainable manner.

Developments in the Southern African security architecture

Since the signing of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (hereafter referred to as the Protocol) in Blantyre in 2001, a number of significant developments have taken place. According to the Protocol the OPDSC is placed under the authority of the SADC Summit; is led by a leadership Troika (consisting of an outgoing, current and incoming chairperson [13]) that rotates on an annual basis and does not overlap with the leadership Troika of SADC itself [14]; will be provided with secretarial services by the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone; and will consist of a number of structures and sub-structures. As will be discussed in more detail further on in this article, the subsequent restructuring process is as yet incomplete.

While, theoretically, the Protocol resolves the impasse over the position of the Organ vis-à-vis the other institutions of regional integration in SADC, some issues remain to be resolved in the process of implementing the provisions of the Protocol. The tension between the military-security establishment on the one hand and the foreign policy-conflict management community on the other is not resolved in practical terms.

In principle the Protocol appears to affirm a conflict management regime that favours political, rather than military solutions [15]. It establishes an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) to counterbalance the long-standing and powerful Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) [16], and contains specific references to the need for political co-

operation and the promotion of democratic institutions and practices. In reality, however, the ISPDC has only met twice and has not yet set up any sub-committees.

The ISPDC is composed of ministers responsible for foreign affairs from SADC member states while the ISDSC consists of ministers responsible for defence, public security and state security. The Ministerial Committee of the Organ, responsible for the coordination of the work of the Organ and its structures, is composed of all the above ministers. The implication is that ministers will have to report to themselves on a next level, an arrangement which may effectively render the Committee obsolete since the ISPDC and ISDSC may in certain circumstances also report directly to the Chairperson of the Organ. As Cedric de Coning argues [17], this 'create(s) a dangerous dualism by splitting the Political and Diplomatic Committee from the military, public security and state security interest of the ISDSC'. As such the problem of differences amongst member states in the preference for either diplomatic or military solutions to problems in the region is not addressed through the restructured Organ.

As if to re-affirm the perception that SADC states continue to shy away from the domestic implications of closer political co-operation, the Organ prioritised the finalisation of a Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) [18]. The Pact was subsequently adopted at the SADC Summit in Dar es Salaam in August 2003. A watered-down version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Pact which obliges members to respond to an attack on a member state as an attack on all, the MDP merely calls upon member states to 'participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate' [19]. More worryingly, it re-commits states to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of any of its members and opens the door for collective action in support of a non-democratic regime [20].

The current year and 2005 sees the majority of SADC states going to the polls, and encouragingly, SADC states have agreed on a number of principles to guide the holding of 'free and fair' elections in the region. The SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections [21], adopted by Heads of State during their Summit in Mauritius in August 2004, contains brief reference to some principles for the conduct of democratic elections and then elaborates on the mandate and constitution of the SADC Observer Mission, guidelines for observers and their rights and obligations. Unfortunately they come a bit late as South Africa and Malawi have already held their elections and elections in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe will be held in the next six months, leaving little time for these states to amend their electoral policies where required and for the preparation of mechanisms to support a SADC Observer Mission. The guidelines also fail to go beyond the actual election period to include the critical run-up phase during which much is determined in terms of the 'environment' in which elections will be taking place. A further critique of the guidelines points out that while the country holding elections may choose to invite the SADC Observer Mission, they are not compelled to do so; that there are no particular guidelines for the composition of the Observer Mission other than that it will be constituted by the Chairman of the Organ; and there are no punitive measures to be employed against a state which fails to comply with these guidelines.

Both the MDP and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections thus, for the time being, remain paper tigers along with so many other Protocols and Agreements signed by Southern African leaders.

Challenges of implementation

In 2001 the Ministerial Committee of the Organ, in line with instructions by the Summit, embarked upon the development of a regional Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO). After many delays the SIPO was finally adopted by SADC heads of state at their summit in Dar es Salaam in 2003 and officially launched by the then chairperson of the Organ, the prime minister of Lesotho, at the August 2004 Summit in Mauritius. While certainly indicative, the plan still lacks clear guidelines for implementation, and remains to be integrated into SADC's more general Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) [22]. In the meantime, progress will be limited and ad hoc until the restructuring process of SADC is completed and the SADC Secretariat is fully staffed in order to be able to carry out its extensive mandate.

An incomplete restructuring process

The first and foremost challenge to the implementation of all of SADC's regional agreements is the conclusion of the lingering restructuring process [23]. With regard to peace and security issues, this includes the establishment of all the committees and sub-committees envisaged in the Protocol and in particular, a department of politics and security at the SADC Secretariat and a conflict management unit including an early warning system and training capacity. At present, there are only two individuals at the Secretariat with a mandate to deal with issues of peace and security.

According to the SADC Treaty [24] and Article 9 of the Protocol, the SADC Secretariat is responsible for providing services to the OPDSC. As an interim measure, the country chairing the Organ has been providing secretarial and administrative support. This arrangement has created problems of continuity and institutional memory that will have to be addressed at the earliest possible stage through the creation of relevant processes and policies to manage the transfer of control to the Secretariat. A recent decision to establish an 'Office of the Chairperson' (under the guise of it being a measure to assist 'weaker' member states to execute their duties) as an additional SADC-supported structure may further delay the transfer of the 'Organ Secretariat' to its rightful place in Gaborone. Keeping the administrative body responsible for issues of security separate from the one that manages regional integration in the economic and social spheres does not bode well for the institutionalisation of a human security perspective in the sub-region. The current arrangement furthermore creates the danger that the Organ agenda is vulnerable to manipulation by the Chair or other political interests in the region.

Regional dynamics and the lack of domestic security

Despite much progress, Southern Africa remains plagued by instability and conflict. The peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is threatened by continued violence in the east of that vast country and political instability in Zimbabwe continues to escalate. Angola is still faced by a myriad of problems pertaining to post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation in a country destroyed by 27 years of virtually uninterrupted war.

To date SADC has failed to respond to the conflict in the DRC in a coordinated manner. The military intervention, on behalf of the government, of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe into the conflict in 1998 was neither mandated, nor rejected by SADC – amounting to a de facto approval thereof. On the other hand, the political and diplomatic efforts of, in particular Zambia, Tanzania, and South Africa, have not enjoyed SADC's broad-based support either. Efforts by erstwhile chairs of the Organ, Mozambique and Lesotho, to convene a SADC task

force to visit the Congo have failed repeatedly. Neither has the DRC formally requested SADC as such to assist in its peacemaking and peacebuilding process.

The case of the DRC is illustrative of the ideological divisions that continue to characterise the region. On the one side there is the militarist block dominated by Angola and Zimbabwe, and on the other we find those who prefer political and diplomatic options for conflict management led by South Africa and Mozambique. Other states are aligned to either block or have opted to sit on the fence.

Angola is an undisputed military giant in the region and with its abundant combination of diamonds and oil has the potential to rise to considerable economic significance as well. As such, a coordinated SADC programme of action to assist in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction at all levels in Angola ought to be a regional priority. The OPDSC, as the SADC structure with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the region, has an important role to play in this regard.

The Zimbabwean situation is a little trickier and presents an instance of a lack of political stability, rather than open violent conflict as in the case of the DRC. If the concept of political stability is expanded to include principles of 'good governance', as implied by the Protocol, even more countries would fail to make the cut. With due consideration for the developments on the continental level [25], the implication of the Zimbabwean situation is to compound the urgency of the need for the region to develop and agree upon a set of minimum standards of good governance (such as, fewer restrictions on press freedoms, freedom of association, and the like) and create a sub-structure to carry out reviews. This needs to be supplemented by the design of a mechanism to deal with signatories who do not comply with these minimum standards [26]. The Organ should, at the same time, set in motion the necessary processes for the establishment of a sub-committee on democracy and human rights under the ISPDSC. The adoption of the abovementioned SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections is a step in the right direction, but there is a long way to go.

In the absence of clear external threats to peace and security in Southern Africa, the lack of domestic security presents the gravest challenge. John Dzimba [27] argues that the fact that most of the threats to the security of people Southern Africa derive from internal, rather than external factors paradoxically represents an advantage – it places the region's destiny in its own hands. Most security threats, particularly within states, are non-military [28], and a holistic approach to addressing these issues needs to overshadow any military considerations. At present Angola and Zimbabwe are the most daunting examples, but human security is not a given in the majority of countries in the region. Close to 50% of SADC's population live on less than a dollar a day, few people can expect to reach the age of 50, and HIV/AIDS is rampant. Such extreme levels of depravation create a breeding ground for political mobilisation, ethnic rivalry and religious extremism, especially if compounded by a lack of mechanisms to ensure the equitable distribution of resources through legitimate political processes. This points to a need for ever-closer co-operation between SADC itself and the OPDSC and also calls for the active involvement of civil society, the private sector and the international community in the Organ's initiatives. Consultation processes with the aforementioned groups ought to be institutionalised, and perhaps a sub-structure needs to be created to this effect.

The need for conceptual clarification [29]

A number of issues and concepts within the Protocol, the Organ, and the collective memory of southern African states beg for clarification. The issue of continued conflict of political values amongst states in the region finds its way into almost all explanations of the failure of the OPDSC and discussions of the challenges to the future of the Organ. Finding common ground is a matter of extreme urgency [30] that would require open and honest dialogue complemented by a free flow of information and due consideration for the domestic conditions of different states.

Certain aspects of the SADC Protocol are ambiguous and may lead to disputes on the basis of divergent interpretations if conceptual clarity is not achieved through additional consultation and, where necessary, agreements and amendments to the Protocol. Brief mention may be made of the apparent negligence to consider instances where conflicts do not conform to either the traditional definition of an inter- or an intra-state conflict, but where the lines are blurred (such as the DRC). The mechanisms for dealing with inter-state war, as entrenched in the UN system and replicated in regional and sub-regional organisations, are not appropriate for resolving such conflicts, and the appropriateness of intervention into the internal affairs of a state appears to be judged post hoc and on political, rather than legal grounds at this point in time. The OPDSC will have to clarify these issues in the regional context and agree upon decision-making and substantive procedures to be institutionalised.

It is also necessary that the SADC and the OPDSC in particular obtain clarity as to the level of integration desired within the region as this has far-reaching implications.

Another potential source of contention in need of clarification is the exact use of, and meaning attached to, collective security and collective defence. Else, as Anthoni van Nieuwkerk warns [31], the Organ may remain 'an instrument in the hands of state elites who will use it to protect and advance their interests...The distinction between the two is crucial. The former is based on political and security protocols and co-operation, whilst the latter entails a more ambitious commitment by states to defend each other against external attack'.

Linking SADC's security architecture to continental developments

As mentioned earlier, Southern Africa's security architecture is inextricably linked to developments at the continental and international level. In the year 2002 the OAU was transformed into the AU and, in recognition of the fact that economic growth and human development cannot take place amid war and violent conflict, its mandate to work towards peace and stability on the continent was reiterated and reinforced. The Protocol establishing the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) [32] was signed by African Heads of State and entered into force on 26 December 2003. While not all that much different from the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in its principles and objectives, the PSC seems to be regarded with much more seriousness by decision-makers within and outside the region. The trend to delegate peacemaking, -keeping, -enforcement and -building activities to the regional level appears irreversible and African leaders' desire to seek 'African solutions to African problems' acts as a further driver. While the guiding principles of the PSC still respect the sovereignty of member states, it now enjoys the right to 'intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity' [33].

Another relevant development at the continental level include the reaffirmation (through the adoption of a relevant Memorandum of Understanding signed in this regard in 2002) of the core values, commitments and performance indicators contained in the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) [9].

Also significant is the commencement of voluntary country reviews of economic and political governance by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) [10].

While the horizontal relationship between these different continental mechanisms remains to be resolved, there is also a need to explore the vertical linkages between these continental structures and sub-regional entities such as SADC. Southern Africa should create the capacity to contribute to the African Standby Force, the continental Early Warning System, and should replicate the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) at the sub-regional level to assess the progress of member states in terms of 'good' political and economic governance. There is considerable pressure on sub-regional entities to sign Memoranda of Understanding with the AU to cement their role as building blocks of the continental security arrangements, but SADC needs to clarify its own objectives and structures first (informed of course by continental requirements) to be able to enter into such negotiations from a position of certainty and strength.

Other immediate challenges

The issue of funding presents another major challenge. SADC is financed by equal contributions from member states, and donations. In order to operate as envisaged, the SADC OPDSC needs a sustainable source of revenue. Already cash-strapped member states may not be able to provide sufficient contributions to maintain a permanent secretariat, a peacekeeping training centre and other standing sub-committees, and reservations with regard to relying upon donor funding are justified. Various options for funding both within the entire SADC structure and independently need to be explored. Beyond the institutional requirements of the Organ, the issue of funding has implications for broad overall capacity and will specifically affect the capacity of the OPDSC to coordinate and accept delegated conflict management responsibilities.

Communication and information sharing represents a historical challenge [34] that could remain an impediment to coordination and integration if it is left unaddressed. Communiqués issued at the end of meetings have been blunt working instruments, not allowing much insight into what really transpired [35]. This effectively excluded not only independent analysts, civil society and national constituencies from participation, but even kept average SADC ministers and officials in the dark. This unhealthy state of affairs was compounded by the fact that SADC did not have a functioning website until recently, and that even official legal documents (i.e. protocols and treaties) were difficult to get hold of. There is a need for the OPDSC to change this situation, use the Secretariat to accurately record all meetings, including Summits, in order to avoid divergent readings, act as an institutional memory and vehicle for continuity, and allow for the broad participation of civil society and other stakeholders while ensuring transparency and accountability. Attention to these kinds of issues should also bode well for relations with the international donor community.

Training and capacity building should take place at various levels within the SADC OPDSC structures. Extending from training the secretariat and SADC diplomats to the creation of an ef-

efficient and credible regional peacekeeping force and community level (peace) education, these activities should form a part of the core functions of the Organ, and might be overseen by a special representative or various subcommittees. The OPDSC should also consider involving civil society capacity in these efforts.

Conclusion

These challenges highlight some of the issues that will be faced by the proponents and drivers of the SADC OPDSC in the near future. They are by no means exhaustive or representative of the complexity of the challenge of creating a well-functioning sub-regional security community. Only a few examples of those exist in the world.

Once the main problem, that of gathering sufficient political will has been overcome, systematic and consultative efforts at confronting the remaining challenges should yield positive outcomes.

The global climate is characterised to a large extent by contraction and a loss of faith in international structures as the principal providers of security and well-being. This presents an environment that encourages regional integration and rewards political stability, good governance and fiscal responsibility.

With regard to security co-operation in Southern Africa, windows of opportunity have been missed in the past. At the advent of a new era in African affairs another opportunity is knocking, and there is justifiable cause for optimism that this time around the time is ripe for inclusive co-operation around the concept of human security that will improve the lives of all the people in Southern Africa.

Notes

1. This article is in essence an updated version of an article by the same author that appeared in *Africa Insight* 32 (4) (2003), entitled 'Challenges facing the newly restructured SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security'.
2. Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Seychelles was a member of SADC until July 2004.
3. For a detailed discussion of this debate see A. Hammerstadt, *Defending the State or Protecting the People: SADC Security Integration at a Crossroads?*, SAIIA Report Number 39, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2003.
4. The broader concept of human security to which the 1996 communiqué establishing the Organ had made specific references represents a noticeable omission in the protocol.
5. SADC, *SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation*, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana, 2001. Also available on SADC's web site: www.sadc.int.
6. SADC, *Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community as Amended*, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana, 2001. Also available on SADC's web site: www.sadc.int.
7. African Union, *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, au Secretariat, Addis Abeba, Ethiopia, 2000. Also available on the iss web site: www.iss.org.za.

8. African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, au Secretariat, Addis Abeba, Ethiopia, 2002. Also available on the ISS web site: www.iss.org.za.
 9. See CSSDCA Kampala Document (1991) and the CSSDCA Solemn Declaration of AU Heads of State and Government (2000). Both documents are available from the AU in Addis Abeba or at http://www.iss.org.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/ouakey.html (2 September 2004).
 10. NEPAD, The New Partnership for Africa's Development, October 2001. Available from the NEPAD web site: www.nepad.org.
 11. For more information on the African Peer Review Mechanism refer to the NEPAD web site: www.nepad.org and the various articles that have been written on this topic.
 12. Refer in particular to articles contained in the SADC Barometer published by the South African Institute of International Affairs and available on their web site: www.wits.ac.za/saiia.
 13. These are Lesotho (outgoing), South Africa (current) and Namibia (deputy chairperson).
 14. Tanzania is the outgoing chair of SADC, Mauritius currently occupies the chair and Botswana was elected as deputy chairperson at the SADC Summit in Mauritius in August 2004.
 15. SADC, SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana, 2001. Also available on SADC's web site: www.sadc.int.
 16. The ISDSC developed out of the Front Line States and has for long been the only functioning component of the sub-region's security mechanism.
 17. C. de Coning, Breaking the SADC Organ Impasse: Report of a Seminar on the Operationalisation of the SADC Organ, accord Occasional Paper, No. 6, 1999.
 18. SADC, SADC Mutual Defence Pact, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana, 2003.
 19. Article 6 (4) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.
 20. A. Hammerstadt, Defending the State or Protecting the People: SADC Security Integration at a Crossroads?, SAIIA Report Number 39, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2003.
 21. SADC, SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana, 2004. (http://www.sadc.int/index.p-hp?action=a2001&news_id=158&language_id=1; 20 August 2004).
 22. SADC, Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana, 2004.
 23. For a discussion of SADC's restructuring process see G. van Schalkwyk, SADC restructuring: Progress and difficulties, in SADC Barometer, issue 1 (2003) (www.wits.ac.za/saiia) and J. Isaksen, Restructuring SADC – Progress and Problems., Report R2002:15, Christian Michelson Institute, Norway (www.cmi.no).
 24. Article 10(a).
 25. Note here the cssdca and the nepad African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
 26. Again, this should be coordinated with broader SADC and Continental efforts.
 27. J. Dzimba, A common sub-regional agenda for peace, human security and conflict prevention: A view from SADC, in Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa, Proceedings of the UNESCO-ISS Expert Meeting held in Pretoria, 23 - 24 July 2001.
 28. Barry Buzan (People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Hemel Hempstead, Wheatsheaf (Boulder, Lynne Rienner), 2nd edition, 1991) argues that human security can be affected by threats emanating from five sectors: military, political, economic, social and environmental.
-

29. G. van Schalkwyk, Challenges facing the newly restructured SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, *Africa Insight* 32 (4) (2003).
 30. Article 8 of the Protocol states that decision within the committees shall be taken by consensus.
 31. A. van Nieuwkerk, Looking ahead: peace-building in southern Africa, in *Global Dialogue*, Volume 5, 1 May 2000, IGD, Johannesburg.
 32. The PSC is a standing decision-making organ of the au and has six objectives: 1) to promote peace, security and stability in Africa; 2) to anticipate and prevent conflicts; 3) to promote an implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace; 4) to co-ordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism; 5) to develop a common defence policy (in accordance with article 4(d) of the act); and to promote and encourage democratic practices and protect human rights as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.
 33. Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. See also A. van Nieuwkerk, The Role of the au and nepad in Africa's New Security Regime, in: S Field (Ed.), *Peace in Africa: Towards a Collaborative Security Regime*, Institute for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, 2004, for a more detailed discussion of the continental security architecture.
 34. 'Inevitably national rivalries and suspicions have undercut any attempts at real information sharing at regional and international levels'. Quoted from J. Cilliers *Regional African peacekeeping capacity – Mythical construct or essential tool?*, in: Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (Eds.), *From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa*, ISS, Halfway House, and SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1999.
 35. A. Tapfumaneyi, The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Interpreting the Decision of the Maputo 1997 SADC Summit, *accord Occasional Paper*, No. 9, 1999.
-